A commercial mortgage-backed security (“CMBS”) is a group of bonds comprised of commercial real estate loans commonly contained in trusts which are then sold to investors.[1] As of 2020, the largest loan contributors to the CMBS market include large banks, such as Citibank, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank, JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, and Bank of America.[2] The commercial property loans securitized by CMBS are generally compromised of commercial properties such as apartment buildings, hotels, factories, office buildings and parks, or shopping malls.[3] These bundles of bonds are also referred to as tranches.[4] CMBS loans are ranked – those with the highest rating have the lowest risk, and those with the lowest rating have the highest risk.[5] Lower risked bonds are known as senior issue, and higher risk bonds are known as junior issue.[6] After the bonds are sold, the bank receives the money from the sale.[7] The bank then lends these proceeds to a subsequent borrower to collect additional fees.[8]
Investing in CMBS poses a lower risk to borrowers than a residential mortgage-backed security (“RMBS”) loan because commercial mortgages typically have a fixed term.[9] CMBS loans are also compromised of fewer loans than RMBS loans.[10] Many investors seek out this loan because they are interested in obtaining property for an extended period of time and CBMS loans provide lower interest rates.[11] Other incentives of CMBS loans include a higher leverage financing, and CMBS loans are nonrecourse loans, and thus have a wider range of accessibility, because investors with lower credit are more readily able to obtain these loans. [12]
Although there are numerous advantages of CMBS loans, there are several disadvantages tied to a CMBS loan investment. First, these loans have prepayment penalties, which penalize a borrower for paying back a loan outside of the fixed term, even in the circumstance where the borrower pays the loan back earlier than the predetermined date.[13] Second, CMBS loans go through a defeasance profess before prepayment, which can be a painstaking process involving the borrower consulting with a financial advisor in order to set up alternative securities to replace any collateral and interest that the lender no longer is obligated to.[14] Lastly, the terms of CMBS loans are more difficult to negotiate, and a borrower has little or no say in the terms of the loans.[15]
The CMBS market has been greatly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. A shift towards working from home has created a failure of roughly $5.5 billion commercial mortgage loans since the summer of 2020.[16] The delinquency rate of CMBS loans in June 2020 was reported to be 10.32%. [17] The delinquency rate continued to increase during October of 2020, during the second wave of the pandemic.[18] The trends of CMBS loans due to the financial crisis that the pandemic has caused are almost identical to the trends of CMBS loans during the 2012 financial crisis, which poses an alarming issue when considering the impact the 2012 crisis had on the CMBS market.[19] The rise of delinquency rates is directly correlated to the effects that COVID-19 has had on commercial real estate: apartment owners, retail owners, restaurants, and hotels are bringing in substantially less income, and are left unable to pay mortgage and other commercial property-related debts.[20]
The last financial crisis in 2012 led to grave delinquencies in the CMBS market, which may signal that the CMBS market will undergo similar disruption in the future, indicative of a similar systemic risk.[21] However, much has been learned from former financial crises and the risks they pose on all types of mortgage backed-security loans, to avoid unnecessary risk in the CMBS market. Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act after the 2007-2008 financial crisis, which affects CMBS by “including risk-retention requirements for asset-backed security sponsors, increased disclosure requirements, the Volcker Rule and enhanced capitalization requirements for banks.”[22]
These protective measures are an attempt to make the CMBS market a safer space for investors by decreasing the systematic risk that the CMBS market decline may have on the overall economy.[23] An unforeseen consequence has been an increase in the price of entry into the CMBS market which affects retail investors, and aspects such as the Volcker Rule, which decreases market liquidity and restricts proprietary trading by preventing a bank from holding inventories of secondary market securities and disallowing a banks from investing in real estate.[24]
While the effects from the COVID-19 pandemic may affect the CMBS market and make these loans less accessible to borrowers, overall, the Dodd-Frank reforms have likely mitigated a majority of the risk to the CMBS market directly tied to COVID-19 and will provide a lasting benefit by decreasing this systematic risk impacting the overall economy.
[1] Owen Haney, The Virus, Risk, and Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities: Examining Dodd-Frank’s Impact in the Midst of a Pandemic, 26 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 391, 394 (2021)
[2]Id.
[3]Carol M. Kopp, Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS), Investopedia, (October 25, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cmbs.asp
[4]Thomas Kenny, What are Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities?, The Balance, (October 7, 2021), https://www.thebalance.com/what-are-commercial-mortgage-backed-securities-cmbs-416910
[5]Id.
[6]Id.
[7]Id.
[8]Id.
[9]Carol M. Kopp, Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS), Investopedia, (October 25, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cmbs.asp
[10]Maegan E. O’Rourke, The New Normal: How the Dodd-Frank Risk Retention Rules Affect the Future of CMBS, 51 Suffolk Univ. L. Rev. 77, 81-82 (2018).
[11]Understanding CMBS and CLO Markets, Signet Investments, “https://signetinvestments.com/understanding-cmbs-and-clo-markets/” https://signetinvestments.com/understanding-cmbs-and-clo-markets/ (Last visited November 6 2021)
[12]Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS): A guide, Quicken Loans (January 27, 2021), https://www.quickenloans.com/learn/cmbs
[13]Id.
[14]Id.
[15]Id.
[16]Dorothy Neufield, Commercial Mortgage Delinquencies Near Record Levels, Visual Capitalist (July 16, 2020), https://www.visualcapitalist.com/mortgage-delinquencies/
[17]U.S. CMBS Delinquencies Resume Increase in October, Fitch Ratings (November 6, 2020), “https://www.fitchratings.com/research/structured-finance/us-cmbs-delinquencies-resume-increase-in-october-06-11-2020” https://www.fitchratings.com/research/structured-finance/us-cmbs-delinquencies-resume-increase-in-october-06-11-2020
[18]Id.
[19]Owen Haney, The Virus, Risk, and Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities: Examining Dodd-Frank’s Impact in the Midst of a Pandemic, 26 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 391, 394 (2021)
[20] Peter J. Irwin et al., CMBS Loan Workouts During COVID-19: A Borrower’s Perspective, Debevoise & Plimpton (May 14, 2020), https://www.debevoise.com/-/media/files/insights/publications/2020/05/20200514-cmbs-loan-workouts-during-covid-19.pdf https://www.debevoise.com/-/media/files/insights/publications/2020/05/20200514-cmbs-loan-workouts-during-covid-19.pdf
[21]Steven L. Schwarcz, Systematic Regulation of Systematic Risk, 2019 Wis. L. Rev. 1, 1 (2019).
[22]Owen Haney, The Virus, Risk, And Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities: Examining Dodd-Frank’s Impact in the Midst of a Pandemic, 26 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 391, 401 (2021)
[23]Craig Furfine, The Impact of Risk Retention Regulation on the Underwriting of Securitized Mortgages, 58 J. FIN. SERVS. RSCH. 91, 93 (2020).
[24]Volcker Rule, The Real Estate Round Table https://www.rer.org/policy-issues/capital-credit/volcker-rule https://www.rer.org/policy-issues/capital-credit/volcker-rule (Last visited November 6, 2021)